

VZCZCXRO1954  
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO  
DE RUCNDT #0598/01 1901530

ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 081530Z JUL 08  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4557  
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000598

SIPDIS  
SENSITIVE

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO S, P, AND IO AND NEA FRONT OFFICES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2018

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [KPAL](#) [KWBG](#) [UNSC](#) [IS](#) [PA](#)  
SUBJECT: SETTLEMENTS UNSCR: USUN PLANS TO INTRODUCE  
ALTERNATE TEXT

REF: A. KUMAR-MORRISON E-MAILS  
[1B.](#) USUN 595 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay M. Khalilzad, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

[¶1.](#) (C) Amb Khalilzad met with the Arab Group on July 7 about the draft resolution on Israeli settlements. He urged the group to delay putting the text in blue for 48 hours so that the Arabs could consider U.S. elements for a comprehensive resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and UNSC experts could begin negotiations towards a constructive, balanced outcome. Although USUN sent the Arab Group draft elements on July 7 (ref A), Libya decided later that day to choose only certain elements from the U.S. proposal, add those to its original resolution, and put the revised text in blue at noon on July 8. The Arab Group will meet at noon to decide whether to endorse Libya's decision, although USUN has received conflicting information about what exactly will happen at this meeting (see below).

[¶2.](#) (C) Amb Khalilzad called several Arab Ambassadors again on July 8 to urge them to refrain from putting the revised text in blue. He argued that doing so would be seen as a sign of bad faith after the U.S. made clear its willingness to engage in serious negotiations towards a constructive outcome. If the Arabs proceed with their revised draft, the U.S. would be forced to work against it, and ensure that the Security Council does not adopt the Arab resolution. Such an outcome would undermine the peace process, polarize the Council, and be seen as a defeat for the moderate Arab states that want the Security Council to take a position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Egyptian PermRep told Amb Khalilzad that the Arab Group would most likely decide to put the revised text in blue at noon, but the Qatari PermRep said the Arab Group would consider the Libyan revisions and U.S. and European elements, then meet with U.S. and European delegations again before deciding whether to put the text in blue. USUN understands the Department may also make calls to Arab capitals on July 8.

[¶3.](#) (C) COMMENT: If the Arab Group decides to move ahead with its revised resolution, despite our efforts, we should be prepared to respond in a way that gives us the best chance of denying the Arabs the nine votes they need to force a U.S. veto. USUN judges that the best way to achieve this goal is to aggressively put forward either a P-3 draft counter-proposal (if the French agree to do so in the face of the Arab refusal to negotiate) or, if necessary, our own counter-proposal, as a way of forcing undecided delegations to choose between a good-faith U.S. effort to begin negotiations towards a constructive outcome and the Arab decision to abuse our goodwill and put their revised text in blue without further negotiations. Putting a counter-proposal forward would also change the basis of the discussion from the Arab draft, with its extensive language on settlements, to a more balanced text.

¶4. (C) COMMENT, cont'd: If the Arabs put their text in blue, USUN would therefore plan to take the steps below, unless otherwise instructed by Washington. We request that the Department issue high-level demarches along these lines to SC capitals as soon as possible. In doing so, we should focus on the five European countries (UK, France, Croatia, Italy, Belgium), Russia (DFM Saltanov reportedly told the Arabs in Moscow that Russia does not want a divided Council and that the Arab Group should seriously consider U.S. / European proposals), Panama (USUN suggests a phone call to VP Sam Lewis, who was helpful during previous Middle East negotiations), and Burkina Faso.

-- Depending on if/when the Arabs put their text in blue, consult with the French and British to decide whether to submit a counter-proposal as a P-3 draft, a U.S. text, or a U.S./UK proposal.

-- Meet with each UNSC delegation to present the counter-proposal (based on the draft resolution contained in reftel) and urge them to support serious, good-faith negotiations on this basis.

-- Formally introduce our resolution during UNSC Ambassadorial-level consultations and announce our intention to convene an experts meeting on our text as soon as delegations receive instructions.

-- Aggressively lobby at least seven delegations to refuse to support the Arab text at least as long as negotiations are underway on the U.S. draft, thereby denying the Arabs the

USUN NEW Y 00000598 002 OF 002

nine votes they need to force a U.S. veto.  
Khalilzad